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Abstract 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports provide policy-relevant insights 
about climate impacts, vulnerabilities, and adaptation through a process of peer-reviewed 
literature assessments underpinned by expert judgement. An iconic output from these 
assessments is the “burning embers” diagram. Burning embers were first used in the Third 
Assessment Report to visualize reasons for concern, which aggregate climate change-related 
impacts and risks to various systems and sectors. In these diagrams, colour transitions show 




indicated by increasing levels of global mean temperature. Here we review the history and 
evolution of the burning embers diagram and the associated reason for concern framework 
describing the methodological approach to risk assessment and construction of the diagram. We 
highlight relevant expert elicitation methods in other fields and detail recent methodological 
advances in IPCC Special Reports aiming to reduce the risk of potential bias in the expert 
judgement, improve the transparency of the assessment, and better account for adaptation. We 
recommend the use of an explicit, transparent, and systematic process of expert elicitation in 
the production of burning embers diagrams to enhance their quality, comparability, and 
credibility in future assessments. 
 
Key Points 
●  Since 2001, the IPCC has used the reasons for concern framework and burning embers 
diagrams to assess and communicate risks from increasing global mean temperature on 
human and natural systems.  
●  The framework and diagram are developed using expert judgement, based on available 
information about climate impacts as arising from climate hazards, exposure and 
vulnerability including the capacity to adapt.  
●  While assessment methods and diagram design have been broadly retained across 
reports, risk levels at given temperatures have generally increased with each 
assessment based on new, more comprehensive science.  
●  Structured expert elicitation methods that specify the process for selecting experts, 
providing external information, eliciting individual and consensus judgments, 
facilitating group interaction can reduce bias and increase result reproducibility. 
●  Recent IPCC Special Reports introduced formal protocols and standardized metrics to 
elicit risk thresholds. Despite challenges such as limited time or funds, these changes 
contributed to transparency and reliability.  
●  Further development and use of standardized and transparent methods to elicit risk 
thresholds and build burning ember diagrams could continue to increase the robustness 





Climate change impacts are unfolding at a pace, intensity, and scale that captures increasing 
public attention1. A key policy objective to limit human interference in Earth’s climate system is 
expressed in Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC): to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that will prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system2. However, it has been a challenge to 
identify precisely when anthropogenic interference becomes “dangerous” because of 
uncertainties in model projections, sectoral and regional differences in impacts, and because 
understanding of what is “dangerous” depends on value judgements3–6. 
 
To help facilitate judgements about risks, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) introduced the “reasons for concern” (RFC) framework and the associated colour-coded 
figures, commonly called “burning ember diagrams”, in the Working Group II (WGII) 
contribution to the Third Assessment Report (TAR) 7,8. In the RFC framework, risks from global 




systems; 2) risks associated with extreme weather events; 3) risks associated with the 
distribution of impacts; 4) risks associated with global aggregate impacts; and 5) risks 
associated with large-scale singular events9. Risk levels are identified using expert judgement, 
based on available information about relevant hazards, exposure, vulnerability, capacity to 
adapt, and impacts10.  RFCs are visualized as “burning embers”, where different risk levels are 
expressed with different colours and uncertainties about precise changes conveyed through 
graded colour transitions (Figure 1).  
 
The RFC framework and burning embers diagram are used as tools for communicating risks 
related to anthropogenic climate change in a way that can support both public discussions and 
policy decisions. For example, the Paris Agreement goal to hold global average temperature 
“well below 2 °C” 11, was informed by IPCC reports which indicated increasingly high risks and 
limited adaptive capacity beyond warming of 1.5 or 2°C 5,12. Accurate understanding of climate-
related risks continues to be critical for decision making, as governments update their 
Nationally Determined Contributions and work to develop national and sub-national disaster 
risk reduction strategies mandated by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. 
Indeed, at UNFCCC COP 25, governments called for increased support on risk assessments, 
including long-term risks from climate change impacts (2/CMA.2 para.26 (a)). The sixth IPCC 
assessment report (AR6) will include a chapter on risks across sectors and regions which is 
expected to update the RFCs and possibly the burning embers diagrams 13. The IPCC 6th 
Assessment cycle including its Special Reports is expected to inform upcoming climate policy 
processes, such as the first Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement in 2023.  
 
The RFC framework and burning embers diagrams have also been the subject of criticism14–19. It 
has been argued that their production should be more systematic, transparent, and comparable 
across reports20. Early assessments of RFCs or burning embers figures did not detail methods, 
particularly with regard to the assignment of risk thresholds. These gaps led to questions 
regarding the reliability of the methods and reproducibility of the burning embers, potentially 
undermining confidence in the robustness of the RFC framework and its use for policy making. 
Some critics have argued that the use of expert judgement in IPCC reports has been “application 
dependent, controversial and implemented differently across chapters and reports”15. Critics 
call for a more formalized approach integrating numerical modelling with expert judgement and 
indicating the full range of assessments made as well as any disagreements21. Much guidance 
material has been produced by IPCC and the research community to strengthen IPCC 
assessments on aspects such as the role of expert judgement and uncertainty language 22–24. 
Nevertheless, questions about the RFCs and the burning embers remain.  
  
In this review, we trace the evolution of the RFC framework and burning embers diagrams, 
focusing specifically on changes in methods and expert elicitation processes. A full analysis of 
expert elicitation methods is beyond the scope of this paper and is available elsewhere 25–32. 
Here, we highlight relevant lessons from other fields and document efforts to develop a more 
systematic approach to estimating the risk transitions that occurred in the 2019 IPCC Special 
Report on Climate Change and Land (SRCCL)33 and 2019 Special Report on the Oceans and 
Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (SROCC)34. Methods are presented and discussed together 
with possible improvements to the formal process of developing expert consensus in future 




paper who have participated in IPCC assessments from TAR onwards – including the 




To begin, we outline the history of the RFC framework and burning embers diagram, 
highlighting changes in methods, design, and risk thresholds.  
  
2.1 Emergence of framework and figure  
 
RFCs and the burning embers figure first appeared in Chapter 19, Vulnerability to Climate 
Change and Reasons for Concern: A Synthesis, of the WGII contribution to TAR7.  The 
multidisciplinary author team, which included physical, biophysical, and social scientists, 
reviewed observed impacts from climate change detailed in the available peer-reviewed 
literature. They debated the level of risk that climate change presented in areas relevant to the 
interpretation of dangerous anthropogenic interference. This led to the insight that a single 
metric or measure would not be sufficient to capture the diversity of risks relevant to policy 
discussions. Besides global economic gains or losses, reasons for concern about climate change 
included the numbers of people affected by projected climate hazards as well as effects on 
ecosystems35–37. While detailed development of the IPCC risk framing did not occur until AR5, 
reasons for concern were considered as relevant attributes of the 'risks’ of climate change. 
 
Early drafts of the chapter included three lines of evidence, later renamed Reasons for Concern, 
in relation to increases in global mean temperature (GMT): impacts on unique and threatened 
systems (such as  tropical glaciers, coral reefs, or indigenous communities); global aggregated 
impacts (such as net damages for market and non-market sectors at the global scale); and the 
probability of large-scale singular events (such as the shutdown of the North Atlantic 
thermohaline circulation or the collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet). Two other RFCs in 
relation to increases in global mean temperature were subsequently added: distribution of 
impacts (including the heightened vulnerability of developing countries); and probability of 
extreme climate events (including floods, soil moisture deficits, tropical storms) 7,38–40. 
 
The Chapter 19 TAR author team mapped future risks along a GMT scale and used the 
consensus of their expert judgments to determine transitions between different levels of risk as 
a function of levels of GMT. GMT increase was assessed in increments of whole degrees as small 
( ~2°C), medium (2-4°C), and large (>3°C)7. The evaluation process was conducted among the 
authors during lead author meetings, and in response to the rounds of expert and government 
review. Judgments were based on the authors' expert assessment of the literature, but this 
process was not conducted nor documented systematically. 
 
The GMT rise above pre-industrial levels was decided to be the most appropriate metric against 
which risk levels could be assessed, due to the availability of impact literature which could be 
related to the GMT, and the fact that the GMT could also be related to GHG concentrations17. 
GMT as used in TAR, and in this paper, refers to global mean surface temperature change as 
used also by all WGs in the AR5. Inevitably, use of GMT as a metric involved assessing and 
synthesising literature in which similar levels of warming were reached at different future 




the dynamics of potential adaptation, in particular the issue that slower rates of warming could 
allow for a greater level of adaptation and hence lower risks.  
 
While a grey-scale version of the burning embers was included in Chapter 19, the first colour 
rendition was published in 2001 WGII TAR Summary for Policy Makers (Fig. 1)41, using colours 
similar to a traffic light arrangement. Traffic light colours have been used to inform decision 
making in various contexts:  in fisheries management42–44, the food industry45,46, in health47, 
geosciences 48,49, and in organisational performance50. Already in 1990, in discussions on 
possible long-term targets for climate change at the Second World Climate Conference (1990), 
traffic light colours were used to represent different levels of increased risk due to climate 
change51–53. In the TAR, authors decided against the use of the green colour to avoid the 
impression of safety or absence of risk51,54. Instead, white was used to indicate neutral or small 
negative or positive impacts. Yellow was used to indicate negative impacts for some systems or 
low risks that could become evident at the denoted increase in GMT. While red was used to 
indicate negative impacts or risks that could be more widespread or greater in magnitude55. 
Gradients of shading across the colours reflected the fact that “change in global mean 
temperature should be taken as an approximate indicator of when impacts might occur; they 
are not intended to define absolute thresholds or to describe all relevant aspects of climate-
change impacts”7,56. Uncertainties about transitions resulted from various sources including 
global warming projections, changes in adaptation or social vulnerability over time, nature of 
the impact assessments, and expert judgement itself. 
 
2.2.  Evolution of Methods and Design 
  
Since the TAR, the RFC framework and burning embers diagrams have been used in nearly all 
IPCC Working Group II Reports as well as in literature outside of IPCC reports57–60 (Figure 2).  
Methods for constructing burning embers, as well as their design, have been elaborated over 
time.  
 
Chapter 19 of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) included a section updating and 
revising the RFC assessment61. In particular, chapter 19 identified a number of criteria that 
could be used to justify the choice of specific reasons for concern62. Criteria included: (i) 
magnitude of impacts; (ii) timing of impacts; (iii) persistence and reversibility of impacts; (iv) 
potential for adaptation; (v) distributional aspects of impacts and vulnerabilities; (vi) likelihood 
(estimates of uncertainty) of impacts and vulnerabilities and confidence in those estimates; and 
(vii) importance of the system(s) at risk. Only the first six criteria were applied to the 
assessment, as criteria seven was deemed to be in the realm of the judgements of policy-
makers3. 
 
As in TAR, results were based on expert judgement about findings in recent literature and IPCC 
reports. The assessment relied on the judgements of a different set of authors. Only two of the 
nineteen AR4 Chapter 19 authors had also contributed to Chapter 19 of TAR. For each RFC the 
evidence of impacts was compiled, and a conclusion made on the location of the transition 
between different levels of risk as a function of  GMT. For example, judgements about “Risks of 
extreme weather events” were based on the literature presented in the AR4 WGI report63 on 
increasing frequency and intensity of weather extremes and on the observed impacts from such 




framework and a burning embers representation was the subject of considerable debate during 
the report preparation, with some voices arguing that both the choice of the RFCs and the 
assignment of risk levels to different levels of warming involved too high a degree of expert 
judgment14. Results were ultimately considered robust and comparable to TAR because 
“judgments were vetted by three rounds of IPCC review and approved in the SPM of both the 
AR4 WGII and Synthesis Reports”62. 
 
Although early versions of the AR4 report included a placeholder for a burning embers diagram, 
no updated diagram was included in either Chapter 19 or in the Summary for Policymakers of 
WGII. An updated burning embers figure was later published in a peer-reviewed academic 
journal62 while variations of burning embers figures appeared in different chapters of WGII AR4 
main report66,67. For the first time, risks to specific sectors and risks under different warming 
trajectories were explored. A figure in Chapter 4 (Figure 4.4)65, and a simplified variant in the 
Technical Summary (Figure TS.6)68, depicts risks to ecosystems against different levels of global 
mean annual temperature rise according to two different global warming trajectories. Colour 
transitions corresponding to those of burning ember diagrams were applied to visualise risks 
for categories of impacts and ecosystems in general66. A figure in Chapter 11 depicts 
vulnerability of key sectors to climate change against different emissions scenarios, highlighting 
possible coping and adaptive capacity at different levels of temperature increase67. 
  
RFCs were published in the Fifth Assessment report (AR5) WGII Chapter 1969 and the SPM70. 
AR5 built on a new risk framework adapted from the 2012 IPCC Special Report on “Managing 
the Risk of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation” (SREX)71,72. 
This framework more formally expresses risks as determined by the combination of climate 
stressors or “hazards”, ecosystems’ and societies’ exposure to these hazards, and the 
vulnerability of these ecosystems and societies.  Thus, a given frequency and magnitude of 
extreme climate events, for example, does not by itself indicate a particular level of risk. Future 
conditions of exposure and vulnerability, as well as the ability to adapt, can vary widely, and 
substantially affect the risk associated with the hazards.  In AR5 and previous RFC assessments, 
exposure and vulnerability were incorporated implicitly in risk judgments to the extent that the 
underlying literature took it into account. Autonomous adaptation as well as limits to 
adaptation (related to the purple zone of the burning embers, see below) were also 
considered9,68. The literature was not extensive enough at that time to support explicit 
differentiation of risks along adaptation pathways or specific dimensions of vulnerability and 
exposure. However, AR5 authors suggested that future risk judgments in RFCs and burning 
ember diagrams should be a function not only of global mean surface temperature change, but 
also of levels of exposure, vulnerability and adaptation 9,69. 
 
An initial assessment of risk transitions for each RFC was made by Chapter 19 authors and 
based primarily on literature. These authors then confirmed or revised their judgments based 
on input from other chapters in the WGII report. That input took the form of a novel 
identification of “key risks,” defined as climate-related risks with the potential to become severe 
and where there is limited ability to adapt. WGII authors identified 102 key risks in their 
domains, which Chapter 19 authors then grouped into eight overarching categories of key risks 
and mapped them to the five RFCs. The assessments of these groups of key risks were then 
considered in the Chapter 19 judgments of the location of risk transitions for each RFC. As 




systematized approach of using key risks to inform RFCs was deemed to allow consistency and 
transparency as well as integration of different types of evidence9.  
 
Further, in AR5 and a subsequent academic paper, confidence levels were introduced for 
transitions based on the type, extent, and agreement of evidence9.  These confidence levels 
complemented the visual representation of uncertainty as blurred boundaries between risk 
transitions in the burning embers diagrams. The confidence levels helped differentiate higher 
from lower confidence judgments on the transitions between risk levels. For example, 
transitions from undetected to moderate risk for RFCs 1 and 2 (unique and threatened system, 
and extreme weather events) were made with high confidence based in part on a growing 
literature on the detection and attribution of impacts. In contrast, judgments about risk 
transitions for RFC 5 (large-scale singular events) were made with medium confidence, given 
substantial uncertainty in the projection of the timing of ice-sheet loss9.  
 
While the design and aesthetics of the burning embers has been broadly retained across 
successive IPCC reports, variations have occurred. In concert with the growing literature on 
detection and attribution of impacts due to climate change, the colour scale of the embers was 
slightly modified in AR569. Thus, the white colour now indicated undetectable risk with no 
impacts “detectable and attributable to climate change”. The yellow colour indicated moderate 
risk where “impacts are both detectable and attributable to climate change with at least medium 
confidence”. The red colour indicated high risk, where risks of severe and widespread impacts 
are judged to be high on one or more of the specific criteria for key risks. A new colour, purple, 
was introduced to indicate very high risk, where all specific criteria for key risks were at very 
high levels, including irreversibility of an impact and exceedance of adaptation limits.  
 
Recent Special Reports introduced refinements and variations in the burning ember diagram 
and RFC framework. The 2018 IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5  Degrees (SR1.5)73 
contains sector-specific embers along with aggregated RFC embers. Given the remit of SR1.5, 
risks were only assessed up to relatively low levels of global warming, focusing on present 
warming of +1.0°C and future warming such as +1.5°C and +2°C above pre-industrial levels. The 
two additional Special Reports in the AR6 cycle integrated an analysis of the role of changes in 
vulnerability, exposure, and adaptation for climate risk more explicitly. Building on previous 
recommendations and illustrations9,69, the SRCCL considered differences in vulnerability 
(including adaptive capacity) and exposure to risk using the emerging literature based on the 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways74–77. SROCC introduced a burning embers diagram illustrating 
risk reduction in the presence of specific effective adaptation-related response78. Other metrics 
instead of GMT, such as sea-level rise or atmospheric CO2, were also used on the vertical axis of 
burning embers figure representing innovations that first appeared in the AR5 Synthesis report 
(Figure 2).  
 
 
2.3. Climate Risk Thresholds 
 
Alongside the evolution of the RFC framework and burning embers diagram has come a 
corresponding shift in the quantification of climate risk transitions. In most cases, the risk level 
at a given temperature has increased with each subsequent assessment, especially between the 




which summarized the change in the risk assessment with a single, indicative number, found 
that the mean of the demarcation centres between moderate and high risks decreased from 
2.85°C in TAR to 1.5°C in AR460. A comprehensive determination of the causes of these changes 
in judgments would require analysis beyond the scope of this paper, but major features of the 
changes suggest that advances in science (including detection and attribution) and broadening 
of the available literature explains most of the differences between assessments69.  Smith et al 
(2009) indicates that, for the RFC3 (distribution of impacts) new knowledge synthesized in AR4 
provided a better identification of systems, sectors, and regions that are particularly at risk, 
especially in Africa. Similarly, more information on changes in extremes and their impacts led to 
the increased risk reported in RFC2 (extreme events) in AR4.62  
 
Across RFC categories, a striking change occurred in judgments of the temperature at which 
risks associated with large-scale singular events (such as ice-sheet collapse) become high. This 
has fallen from about 5.5 °C (above pre-industrial) in the TAR to below 2°C in SR1.5 following 
new findings in climate science80–85 . For example, AR5 Chapter 19 indicates that the main cause 
of change since AR4 was new evidence about ice-sheet loss during the last interglacial period, at 
no more than 2°C average global warming above pre-industrial69. Adaptation to associated sea-
level rise was deemed to be possible if ice-sheet loss occurs slowly, such as over a millennium9.  
However, since AR5, new observations suggest that the West Antarctic Ice sheet is already in 
the early stages of Marine Ice-Sheet instability86. SR1.5 also considered findings about the 
slowdown of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Current, the El Niño-Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO) and the role of the Southern Ocean in the global carbon cycle, concluding that risk levels 
at lower temperatures had increased86. 
 
In contrast, a number of risk transitions have remained relatively stable across multiple reports, 
such as the transition to medium and to high risk for the RFC on unique and threatened systems 
and for the RFC on distribution of impacts. New literature is still important in such cases when it 
provides more confidence in judgments through broader physical, ecological, and 
socioeconomic evidence compared to previous assessments. For example, between AR4 and 
AR5 literature provided new insight on how ocean acidification and warming together increase 
long-term coral degradation87. 
 
In some cases, the level of risk at a given temperature has decreased slightly in subsequent 
reports. For example, risk levels associated with extreme events appear at somewhat higher 
global warming levels in AR5 compared to AR4. At least two factors may have contributed to 
such changes: refinement of the framework, with clearer criteria for judging risk, and more 
precision in the consideration of temperature levels associated with risks. In particular, the TAR 
mainly refers to risk estimates for broad temperature ranges (observed past, < 2°C above 1990, 
2°C-3°C, > 3°C), and it further clarifies that temperature should be taken as approximate 
indications of impacts, not as absolute thresholds7. Thus the information from the TAR was both 
more limited and expressed with less detail, indicating that small differences with the following 
reports should not be over-interpreted. Moreover, the TAR associated white areas with “no or 
virtually neutral impact or risk,”56 while the AR5 refined the definition for the transition 
between white and yellow by adding the specific criterion that there is at “least medium 
confidence that impacts associated with a given risk are both detectable and attributable to 




probably also contributed to the judgment of less climate change-related risk from extreme 
events at low levels of warming. 
 
These results highlight the potential use of the RFC framework and burning embers diagram to 
evaluate trends in risks over time. It is also clear that, to allow for comparisons, consistent and 
fully reproducible techniques must be used in rendering the ember diagrams, including choice 
of colours. This review of RFC and burning embers history indicates that assessed risk levels 
mainly evolved in response to new research findings, but also that the conceptual framework 
was supplemented and adapted over time. Continued use of the RFC framework and burning 
embers diagram requires enhanced and sustained attention to how the increasing amount of 
knowledge is taken into account to assess risks. More clarity on the details of the evolution of 
the conceptual framework and more rigor in the assessment methodology are needed, while 
considering that it would be preferable for results to be comparable to earlier ones.  
 
3. Expert elicitation: lessons from other fields 
 
Given the critical role of expert judgement in the RFC framework and construction of burning 
embers, it is prudent to explore how expert elicitation is conducted in other well-established 
disciplines. For example, expert elicitation is used frequently in health sciences 25,27,32 when 
insufficient empirical evidence exists to inform clinical recommendations, parameters of 
decision analytic models, research priorities, quality indicators, or best practices in research88–
96. Well-known approaches for structured, formal expert elicitation include the Classical 
Method97, Consensus Development Conference98, the Delphi99 method, the Nominal Group 
Technique100 and the SHeffield ELicitation Framework101 (Box 1). All of these approaches share 
several common practices for recruiting experts, preparing the elicitation exercise, eliciting and 
aggregating expert judgments, transforming individual judgments into data useful for analyses 
and aggregation, and providing feedback to experts and the wider scientific and policy 
communities 26–28,32,102. However, these formal expert elicitation methods vary in the specific 
design features that have been developed to facilitate the performance of experts in providing 
accurate, reliable, and replicable judgments (see Table 1). 
 
Reviews of expert elicitation approaches have not identified any one standard methodology as 
inherently superior to others, but rather discuss which approaches may be more or less 
appropriate for a given context in their traditional form27,102,103 . Aspects of elicitation to 
consider for a given exercise include the data collection technique (e.g., Likert ratings, 
parameter values), elicitation mode (e.g., in-person, online, hybrid), and process for 
synthesizing individual elicitations into a group judgment (e.g., statistical aggregation, group 
facilitator discretion). 
 
BOX 1: Overview of Formal Expert Elicitation Methods 
 
The Classical Model of structured elicitation scores experts on their performance against 
empirical data for known parameters, using their performance to create and validate 
combinations of all expert judgments on the unknown variables of interest104,105.Calibration 
questions are used to assess the statistical accuracy and information provided by each expert. 
Performance-based weights are then used for combining the expert judgments on the unknown 





The Consensus Development Conference involves an open meeting over several days of a selected 
group of experts98. This provides a public forum for the discussion of issues on the topic of 
interest. Stakeholders external to the expert group make presentations that are considered by 
the expert group until they reach consensus on a decision. Both the public and private sessions 
of the consensus development conference are chaired 32. 
 
The Delphi method provides a structured, systematic communication approach for experts to 
independently and anonymously provide their initial judgments about the topic of inquiry. 
There are iterative rounds of feedback and modification of judgments based on the views of 
other experts on the panel96. The final group "consensus" 25 is from statistical aggregation of the 
individual responses. 
 
The Nominal Group Technique aims to structure interaction within a group or committee with 
differing views100. Experts first record their ideas independently and privately. After collating 
these ideas, the facilitator then lists one idea from each expert in front of the group in a “round-
robin” fashion until all ideas have been listed and discussed. Each expert privately records their 
judgments for each idea until discussion ceases. Lastly, the individual expert judgements are 
aggregated statistically to derive the group judgement. This technique allows more ideas to be 
expressed and elaborated due to the initial brainstorming and following discussion of all 
generated ideas32 . 
 
The SHeffield ELicitation Framework (SHELF) elicits probability distributions for uncertain 
quantities from a group of experts to inform policy decisions 101. SHELF typically involves a face-
to-face meeting with a small group (approximately 6-10) of experts led by a trained facilitator. 
All members are aware of each other’s responses, and the group discusses modifications to a 
probability distribution aggregated from their individual responses until consensus is reached. 
Guidance and templates for pre-elicitation, elicitation, facilitation, and achieving group 
consensus judgments based on the perspective of a “rational impartial observer” are publicly 
available. 
 














Pre-elicitation training on 
probabilities and 
uncertainty 
Yes No No No Yes 
Primary mode of  
expert elicitation 













Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Controlled feedback 
provided to participants 




Multiple rounds of 
individual elicitation 
No No Yes Yes No 
Direct contact  
among experts 
No Yes No Yes Yes 
Statistical aggregation of 
individual elicitation into 
group judgment 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Comparisons are based on the traditional or default approach to implementing each approach. Specific groups 





Expert elicitation processes can take considerable effort on the part of the researcher and 
requires the commitment of the respondents. As a result, there are several considerations that 
need to be taken into account. While face-to-face discussions provide an opportunity for experts 
to examine disagreements in-depth107 and take ownership of the material 27, they also are more 
costly in time and money. In addition, facilitators of expert elicitation exercises need to consider 
potential biases that can result from the type of respondents selected, the type of preparatory 
material provided, the elicitation questions and method of analysis, and specific research 
design. For example, anchoring subsequent questions to answers given to the first question, 
accessing the easiest to retrieve memory to answer questions, and lowering probabilities 
through range-frequency compromise are only a few of the psychological biases found in expert 
elicitation106. Careful consideration and reporting of sources of bias is therefore required 
97,106,108.  
 
Despite these challenges, structured expert elicitation approaches are increasingly used in a 
variety of fields to fill knowledge gaps or where insufficient research or data is available 109–112.  
Authors have argued for the application of the expert elicitation technique, as well as the 
increased use of systematic reviews, in environmental and climate sciences113–116. Procedures 
for a formal expert elicitation have been outlined, combining individual and collective 
deliberations117. Expert judgement techniques have already been used in relation to global 
climate change to estimate climate sensitivity118, tipping points in the climate system119, and 
future sea-level rise112. 
 
 4. Advances in Expert Elicitation Methods in Recent IPCC Reports  
 
Responding to earlier critiques of the standardization and rigor of the RFC framework and 
burning embers diagrams, Special Reports in the IPCC AR6 cycle33,34,78,120 have incorporated 
elements of expert elicitation protocols.  The SRCCL focused on documenting and standardizing 
the expert elicitation process, while SROCC developed a standardized scoring system for risk 
threshold judgements.  
 
4.1. Methods in the Special Report on Climate Change and Land (SRCCL) 
  
The SRCCL sought to identify risks to humans and ecosystems from climate change interactions 




change, land-use change, and socio-economic development pathways was assessed. A 
systematic approach was needed to characterize the risks reflected in this wider literature and 
to account for sources of uncertainty and variability, including professional biases inherent in 
individual expert’s interpretation of literature. 
 
Figure 4 outlines the broad steps used in the SRCCL. A full description is provided in this paper’s 
supplementary material as well as in supplementary information to SRCCL Chapter 7120.  An 
expert elicitation process based on design features commonly employed in the Delphi and 
SHELF methods was used to combine the benefits of both individual and collective 
deliberations. To make the methodology more transparent, a protocol for eliciting expert 
opinions was developed including an a priori plan for analysing the data (i.e., a pre-analysis 
plan), an explicit sampling frame and eligibility criteria for selecting experts to participate in the 
process. Eight SRCCL authors participated in the elicitation process, representing different 
chapters of the SRCCL report, different regions, genders, and disciplinary backgrounds. This 
diversity helped decrease the impact of individual subjective biases on risk transitions and 
confidence levels121.  
 
In the first step, over 300 journal articles referenced in SRCCL chapters and beyond were 
reviewed to extract quantitative and qualitative information about past and future impacts of 
climate change, socioeconomic pathways, and land use scenarios on humans and ecosystems. 
Evidence from each of these journal articles was added to a shared database. Using this 
database and considering criteria used in other parts of the report122, experts agreed on 
thresholds for each risk level. For example, a risk was considered moderate if under 1 million 
people or between 50 and 300 million hectares were likely to be adversely affected.  
  
The expert elicitation took place in three rounds. In the first round, for every ember, experts 
provided a quantitative judgement of the GMT levels (upper bound, lower bound, and best 
estimate of location of transition) corresponding to each of the three risk level transitions along 
with reasoning for these judgements. These results were anonymised, transitions were 
aggregated, plotted to show the spread of results (Figure 5), and then shared with the full group 
of experts. In the second round, experts had the opportunity to revise their quantitative 
assessment and rationale. This typically involved re-examining the literature for transitions 
where the initial judgment differed from other experts. Results were again compiled, 
anonymised and shared with experts. The third round consisted of a group discussion with a 
facilitator, who ensured that due consideration was given to differing evidence-based 
viewpoints among panelists123.  In the group conversation, an expert would present an ember, 
describing their choice of transition and citing the literature that supports it. Each transition 
was discussed until consensus was reached. The anonymised results and facilitated discussion 
diminished the risk of any one expert dominating the consensus process124.  
 
A few factors during the group discussion helped experts refine the transition ranges and 
converge towards consensus. First, “very high risk” requires that “the ability to adapt is 
limited”69. Agreeing on what constituted adaptation and what constituted a limit to adaptation 
narrowed the uncertainty range for the transition to very high risk. Second, the assessment 
involved a large number of studies reporting a wide variety of indicators and methods (e.g. 
detection and attribution, biophysical models, economic models, etc.). The group discussion led 




uncertainty in the risk transitions is represented through both the width of the temperature 
transition and the confidence level of the transition. Narrow transitions may be more 
informative for policy-making. However, narrowing a transition range typically comes at the 
cost of reducing the confidence level associated with the transition. A compromise had to be 
found during the discussion to minimize the width of the transition while maintaining the 
highest possible confidence level.  
  
4.2. Methods in the Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere (SROCC) 
 
While the SRCCL used a structured process to improve the robustness and traceability of the 
risk assessments, the SROCC report used standardized metrics to evaluate end-of-century risks 
from sea-level rise. The assessment also considered risks under specific adaptation pathways. 
Chapter 478 of SROCC considered four illustrative geographies covering a wide range of low-
lying coastal situations across different latitudes, hemispheres, development contexts, and 
urban/rural settings: resource-rich coastal cities, large tropical agricultural deltas, urban atoll 
islands, and Arctic communities. Nine metrics were used as proxies for the components of the 
IPCC risk framework: i.e. hazard (coastal flooding; coastal erosion; and salinization of 
groundwater lenses, soils and surface waters), and exposure and vulnerability of ecosystems 
and people (density of assets; and degree of degradation of natural buffer ecosystems). As an 
innovation, four generic types of responses to sea-level rise (hard engineered coastal defences; 
restoration of degraded ecosystems; relocation of people and assets; and limiting subsidence) 
were incorporated into the assessment, making it possible to explore risk levels and transitions 
by 2100 under low-to-moderate and maximum adaptation.  
  
Figure 6 outlines the broad steps used in the SROCC by Chapter 4. A full description is provided 
in Supplementary Information to SROCC Chapter 4 and further summarized in Supplementary 
Information here. The assessment method relied on a scoring system and expert judgment by 
eight chapter and external contributing authors, but without implementing a formal elicitation 
method as done in the SRCCL. The scoring system was designed to assess the relative 
contribution of each of the nine metrics to risk at present and by 2100 against three sea-level 
rise scenarios: mean RCP2.6 (+43cm), mean RCP8.5 (+84cm), and the upper likely range of 
RCP8.5 (+110cm). The scoring exercise relied on the existing literature and considered well 
documented specific real-world case studies, e.g. New York City (USA), Rotterdam (The 
Netherlands) and Shanghai (China) for the resource-rich coastal cities; and Male’ (Maldives), 
South Tarawa (Kiribati) and Fongafale (Tuvalu) for the urban atoll islands.  
 
For each illustrative region and each metric, the scores were aggregated by sea-level rise 
scenario to highlight two risk levels in 2100, one under a “low-to-moderate response” scenario 
(i.e., with small additional efforts in adaptation compared to today) and one under a “maximum 
potential response” scenario. “Maximum potential response” in this context referred to an 
ambitious and effective combination of both incremental and transformational adaptation (e.g., 
population relocation), assuming minimal financial, social, and political barriers. Such 
distinction was made by associating positive scores to the hazard and exposure-vulnerability 
metrics, as they increase risk, and negative scores to the adaptation response metrics, as they 
decrease risk.  
 




range of the IPCC risk colouring language (from white to deep purple) to highlight nine scoring 
levels: Undetectable, Undetectable to Moderate, Moderate, Moderate to High, High, High to Very 
High, Very High, Very High to Extremely High, Extremely High. With this, a specific risk level has 
been assigned to each aggregated score, producing the final burning embers and risk 
transitions.  
 
4.3 Strengths and limitations of SRCCL and SROCC approaches 
 
The use of formal expert elicitation processes and the development of scoring systems for 
judgements may have increased the transparency and robustness of the RFC framework and 
burning embers figures in a variety of ways. Methodological techniques used in SRCCL such as a 
common database of literature, anonymous judgements with justification, and use of multiple 
expert elicitation rounds, may have reduced potential biases such as pressure to conform to 
dominant individuals or anchoring in individual opinions29,123,125. The scoring process in SROCC, 
and the articulation of metrics and judgement criteria and publication of outcome in a detailed 
supplement increased transparency and standardization. 
 
Despite this progress, a variety of limitations remain. Both SRCCL and SROCC assessments could 
further benefit from the involvement of a greater diversity of experts. Studies have shown that 
heterogeneity, or a diversity of profiles and areas of expertise, in expert groups may lead to 
better performance compared to a more homogenous group121. Common social and 
psychological biases in human decision-making, such as groupthink126 and overconfidence127 
may limit performance in homogenous groups. The SRCCL could have more clearly articulated 
metrics with which to evaluate risk thresholds. In turn, SROCC could have used multiple rounds 
of independent evaluations to better record spread and changes in judgements. Additionally, the 
relationship between risk and selected SROCC metrics and aggregated scores will need to be 
further validated. 
 
Ultimately, the selection of an optimal expert elicitation technique within the IPCC process will 
need to balance the confidential nature of the process, finite funds, limited time for meetings, 
coordination challenges related to geographic distribution of authors across different time 
zones128, the broad scope of relevant literature, the integration of different forms of evidence 
and different values129. Future IPCC assessments may wish to build on, or combine, the advances 
made in the SRCCL and SROCC.  For example, a set of experts could use a scoring system, as in 
SROCC, to estimate the contribution of different human-related drivers to risk levels under 
various climate change scenarios. Then, as in SRCCL, multiple independent assessment rounds 
could be used in combination with collective deliberations to discuss individual experts’ 
underlying rationales and get consensus on final risk scores. This approach could be particularly 
useful for evaluating risks from climate change to human wellbeing or security – areas in which 
identifying temperature related thresholds for risk could be difficult given both the state of the 
literature and context-specificities. Future assessments could alternatively draw from other 
relevant expert elicitation approaches. Either way, we believe that adding structured design 
features to expert elicitation should be encouraged, and the advantages and disadvantages of 
different approaches further investigated. 
 




The RFC framework and burning embers figure are key components of the IPCC’s risk 
assessment process. The RFC framework helps aggregate climate-related risks into easily 
understood and policy-relevant categories, while the burning embers figure communicates risks 
using a common colour system and scale. This framework and iconic image have played a role in 
public policy and discourse6.  While methods for analysis and design elements have been 
broadly retained across successive IPCC reports, changes have been made over time including 
the consideration of key risks, altered use of colours and the addition of confidence judgements. 
This review indicates that the risk level at a given temperature has generally increased with 
each subsequent assessment. It is critical to ensure these changes are driven by new science and 
not by methodological variations between reports or author bias. The SRCCL and SROCC added 
innovations to the expert elicitation process to strengthen scientific robustness and credibility.   
 
For further enhanced usefulness in IPCC assessments, authors of IPCC reports may wish to 
identify and apply a standardized expert elicitation protocol to unify anonymous judgements 
with group discussions. Whatever method is selected, at a minimum, the protocol should specify 
the process for providing external information, eliciting individual judgments, facilitating group 
interaction, and developing consensus judgments. Assessment objectivity can be ensured by 
having an independent moderator, neither a chapter author nor a participant in expert 
elicitation, facilitate discussions. Assessment transparency can be strengthened by making 
workflows open, including tables with data from relevant literature, scoring and by pre-
publishing the protocol75. Authors may also wish to provide clear criteria or narratives for risk 
transitions used in ember diagrams. Maintaining consistent risk thresholds and metrics across 
chapters and reports would help strengthen communication about changes in risk levels for the 
decision-makers as well as the general public. Additionally, clear design protocols should be 
created for burning embers figure creation, including the use of standardized colours for risk 
levels and a standardized format to indicate confidence levels, as well as specific requirements 
on translating numerical risk estimates into ember graphs, preferably using a standard 
computer code or program.  
 
Future risk assessments should include consideration of regional risks, the impacts of socio-
economic pathways on risk and diversified adaptation scenarios and dynamics. Demand for 
regionally specific RFC or embers has been growing130. The SRCCL and the SROCC laid some 
foundations for such analysis by including illustrative geographies or embers for specific 
latitudes. The SRCCL paved the way for the consideration of the influence of socioeconomic 
pathways on risk, while SROCC considered the relationship between different adaptation 
measures and risk.  Assessing the potential benefits of adaptation in terms of risk reduction is 
key to progressively informing important and emerging policy concerns such as limits to 
adaptation, residual risks and benefits to be expected from both mitigation and adaptation. The 
influence of the rate of climate change on risks and adaptation potential could also benefit from 
further investigation. Further methodological improvement is needed to evaluate human 
adaptation, adaptation capacity relative to the degree of climate change, and adaptation limits 
including evolutionary and socio-cultural factors.  
 
Going forward, the expert judgment-based risk assessments should explicitly document how 
they consider changes in ecological and anthropogenic exposure and vulnerability (driven by 
socioeconomic development as well as adaptation or mitigation responses), in addition to 




provided by IPCC WGI). One important contribution to this integration is provided by new 
impact modelling initiatives that can streamline the development of burning embers across the 
RFCs and contribute to tracking their evolution in time. The Inter-Sectoral Impact Model 
Intercomparison Project (ISIMIP)131 for example, aims at harmonising impact projections across 
a range of sectors by providing consistent socioeconomic and meteorological forcing data and a 
unified simulation protocol for multi-model assessments. The ongoing phase (ISIMIP2b)132 
provides a unique opportunity for supporting quantitative risk assessments for the AR6 cycle. 
Acknowledging that no one modelling approach is free of shortcomings and that models are 
unable to capture all dynamic processes related to impacts and adaptation, it will be important 
to continue to consider other sources of evidence of changing risks and effectiveness of various 
options for risk management. 
 
Finally, there have been calls to better communicate the likelihood of future impacts to help 
policy makers set priorities on actions20,133. Some attempts have been made to do this in the 
past. For example, Figure SPM.10 in AR5 links the levels of risk by GMT with over time 
cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions, illustrating emissions reductions required to keep 
GMT, and risks, below certain levels134. However, finding ways to clearly visualize the severity of 
impacts, the likelihood, and rate of change or temperature remains a challenge. Working Group I 
and Working Group II may wish to collaborate and identify ways to further communicate the 
probability of potential impacts, considering that risk associated with low likelihood but severe 
impacts cannot be ignored.   
 
The run-up to the first global stocktake of the Paris Agreement in 2023 and the next round of 
UNFCCC’s “periodic review of the long-term global goal under the Convention and of overall 
progress towards achieving it” provide an opportune moment for on-going work in all these 
areas. Increasing the reproducibility and credibility of risk assessments, and improving clarity 
and communication of the results, can facilitate more effective global, regional and local 
decision-making about consequences of dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system. Having more credible and traceable information about risk levels associated with 
different levels and rates of warming, and different socioeconomic pathways or adaptation 
measures, policymakers will be better equipped to make decisions about mitigation, adaptation 
and disaster risk reduction. The IPCC has made significant progress in this area, with 
innovations to the reasons for concern framework and burning embers figures in recent Special 
Reports. We hope this review will enable future assessments to continue to strengthen expert 
elicitation, thus allowing information to aid a range of climate policy decisions to minimize, and 
preferably avert, dangerous anthropogenic climate change. 
 
 
Figure Captions:  
 
Figure 1. The first representation of burning embers and the Reasons for Concern 
framework from the IPCC Third Assessment Report Technical Summary56. The figure 
depicts impacts or risks from climate change by reason for concern. Each row corresponds to a 
reason for concern, and shades correspond to severity of impact or risk. White means no or 
virtually neutral impact or risk, yellow means somewhat negative impacts or low risks, and red 
means more negative impacts or higher risks. An identical figure, in grey scale, was included in 




burning embers in subsequent IPCC reports are vertical with a column representing each reason 
for concern.  
 
Figure 2. The evolution of the burning embers diagram in IPCC reports and other 
publications. Images under the left panel were published in IPCC assessments while images in 
the right panel were published in other scientific literature. The year for publication is indicated 
in the middle. The images are illustrative examples of the application of the embers concept and 
in most cases omit parts of the original figure. Variations in design and content have occurred 
since the Third Assessment Report, including the introduction of embers for specific sectors, 
regions in the Fourth Assessment Report and the use of axis aside from global mean 
temperature starting in the Fifth Assessment Report. In the Sixth Assessment cycle embers 
diagrams have compared risks for different socio-economic pathways and for different adaptive 
capacities with sea level rise as an axis. Images published in literature outside of the IPCC have 
varied more widely over time but often retained similar colour schemes.  
 
Figure 3. Comparison of risk thresholds across IPCC Assessments. All burning embers are 
presented with the same colour and temperature scale, removing technical details that varied 
between the original publications while carefully keeping the levels of the colour changes. The 
vertical scale indicates global mean surface temperature increase above pre-industrial. The grey 
areas on top of each column correspond to temperatures above the assessed range in the 
corresponding report. Dashed lines indicate the middle of the “risk transitions” (e.g. half-way 
between moderate and high risk), illustrating how it evolved with each subsequent publication 
25,26. The graphical scale of risk categories (that is, the horizontal colour bar) appeared first in 
AR5; earlier reports used slightly different words to define the risk levels. See Supplementary 
Material for details about the production of this figure135. 
 
Figure 4. Flowchart of the steps involved in expert elicitation used in the SRCCL. The 
methods included a standardized literature review, development of assessment protocol, three 
rounds of expert elicitation combining elements of both the Delphi technique and SHELF 
method. 
 
Figure 5. Expert elicitation for the Food Stability ember in SRCCL. The vertical axis 
represents GMT increase since the pre-industrial period. In panels a and b, the curves 
show probability density functions for each transition - undetectable to moderate in yellow; 
moderate to high in red; high to very high in purple. Those probability distributions were 
estimated on the basis of the set of expert judgements about the GMT increase corresponding to 
each transition, for two successive elicitation rounds. The temperature range of two of the 
distributions - undetectable to moderate and high to very high - ‘shrank’ between the 1st (panel 
a) and 2nd round (panel b). This indicates increasing consensus around transitions as experts 
had the chance to consider justifications and evidence presented by colleagues in the first round 
of elicitation. For moderate to high risk, the distribution did not change substantially, 
demonstrating that the elicitation does not always result in convergence. After the third round, 
a group discussion, the final temperature ranges for transitions identified were (panel c). 
 
Figure 6. Flowchart of the steps involved in the sea-level rise risk assessment in the 
SROCC. A standardized scoring system was created to assess the relative contribution of nine 
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